:: Legal argument is entered into

Not wishing to let a moment slip by I replied to TfL's Data Protection Manager as follows:

28th October, 2004
Information Access & Compliance Team
Transport forLorn
6th Floor, Windsor House
London SW1H 0TL
Fax 020 7941 0185

REF: ICT/047
Dear [NAME REDACTED],

Thank you for your speedy reply to my request. It is indeed a pity that customer services at Transport forLorn do not demonstrate the same professionalism – much less even manage to fulfill their statutory obligations.

I trust that you will find enclosed the information you have requested from me. I have made out a cheque for £10.00 payable to TfL by way of payment. I imagine that you will find this acceptable.

In a nutshell, I am seeking footage of myself taken aboard MA75 between 8:20 and 8:50am on Thursday, October 21, 2004. To aid you in identifying myself and redacting the identities of third parties I have enclosed the requested passport photograph. I should be grateful if this could be returned as I may have need of it again soon.

I am further requesting (and have written separate correspondence on this matter) a full record of my complaints to TfL customer services and any internal correspondence that concerns or identifies me within the meaning of the Act. You should discover at least some of these filed under ref:138965/AM and 144586.

I note with interest your citation of Durant V FSA and have perused the judgment at length. Having done so I am quite confident that nothing within said judgment impinges upon my rights to access both the footage I request and, indeed, all of the records held by TfL concerning my complaints and communications with them over the last eight weeks.

Most of Durant V FSA hinges upon the precise legal definitions of key sections of the Act and, indeed, Durant lost in part because some of the data to which he was seeking access did not fall within the scope of what Judge Zeidman, QC believed constituted "personal data". Further to this the document discusses the tension between the disclosure of what can be deemed "personal data" and the redaction of specific data to protect the privacy of third parties. There are also conclusions drawn about Durant's intent to use the DPA as a tool for discovery in Third Party litigation.

However you decide to respond to my submission I am confident that the following quote from the judgment establishes prima facie my right to have access to a copy of footage taken of me whilst I am aboard a TfL bus. Article 2(a) of the 1995 Directive defines "personal data" as:

"any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (data subject); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his (sic) physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity;"

Furthermore, Section 1(1) of the 1998 Act develops the notion: "personal data means data which relate to a living individual who can be identified

(a) from those data, or
(b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller,

and includes any expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the intentions of the data controller or any other person in respect of the individual;"

I am only to happy to set your mind at rest concerning that appeal judgment which is based upon a completely different set of circumstances.

Thank you for your kind attention in dealing with this matter. I look forward to hearing from you again soon.

Yours faithfully,

[NAME REDACTED].

I look forward to publishing his response and any little surprises that my complaints record might reveal.

Oh, I've passed my stop again, silly me!